Autism is a behaviorally defined disorder that comprises a controversial diagnostic category due to heterogeneity in symptomatology, causation, and etiology and significant variance in response to intervention. In this article, the authors provide a brief overview of the clinical category and a summary of diagnostic developments with respect to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Regarding causation and etiology, they briefly discuss selected perspectives from the fields of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology. The article concludes with a summary of effective behavioral strategies for the treatment of children with autism. This section highlights the importance of early intensive behavioral intervention and includes a discussion of some important aspects of this approach.
attachment, lack of interest in other people, and impairment in imaginative activities such as play.
The constellation of impairments encompassing communication, social interaction, and imagination has been referred to as the "triad of impairments" (Wing & Gould, 1979) . This term suggests a unity of symptoms as opposed to the existence of three separate impairments. Whether there is a specific underlying neurological or neuropsychological core that relates these symptoms is a matter of controversy. Frith (1989) proposed that autism constitutes a natural entity with a high plausibility of a single underlying psychological explanation, whereas others argue that social impairment is likely to be caused by a variety of neuropsychological deficits (Fein, Pennington, Markowitz, Braverman, & Waterhouse, 1986) . Regardless of theoretical speculation about underlying neuropsychological dysfunctions, the triad of impairments constitutes a core constellation on which the diagnosis of autism is made. The diagnosis of autism is not made if the child has an isolated, single symptom, such as a problem with language, social interaction, or imagination, but only if deficits in these categories cooccur as a consistent pattern.
Approximately half of the autistic population fails to develop speech, and the majority fails to use speech in a functional manner when it does develop (Volkmar, 1991) . In cases where communicative speech develops, it is often less advanced than in typical peers and is characterized by short demands, lack of appropriate deixis (e.g., use of I/you pronouns, here/there constructions, and now/then relations), idiosyncratic use of words, and restricted use of grammatical variants. For individuals with more advanced language, the content of speech and conversation is typically very restricted and characterized by perseveration on specific topics such as the weather or automobiles. Although children with autism display profound semantic and pragmatic language deficits, the disorder does not appear to involve a fundamental problem with syntax (Tager-Flusberg, 1989) .
Language comprehension is also typically severely impaired (Waterhouse & Fein, 1982) , and expressive language is typically more advanced than receptive language. Although children may be able to follow simple directions such as "sit," "come here," and "eat," a high percentage of the population fails to develop an understanding of more complex instructions and abstract concepts, including the relationship between objects (prepositions), relational adjectives, deictic categories (e.g., personal pronouns), temporal relations (e.g., first/ last), and language that transcends the literal.
In addition to the deviance of speech, there is typically an absence of nonverbal gestures, including joint attention behavior such as pointing, nodding, and shaking the head with respect to questions and normative eye contact. Although there is general agreement that language impairment is a core symptom of autism, there is little agreement regarding the nature of the language impairment and whether it constitutes a primary deficit or whether it is a function of other critical aspects of the syndrome (Tager-Flusberg, 1989) .
Studies of cognitive skills have documented a great degree of heterogeneity within the autistic population (L. Green, Fein, Joy, & Waterhouse, 1995) . However, there appear to be some relatively characteristic patterns. Individuals with autism typically demonstrate islets of abilities such as adequate and often superior rote memory skills, good visual/spatial skills, and remarkable attention to detail. The latter is characterized by selective attention to odd, minor features of the environment to which typically developing children scarcely pay attention. Lovaas, Schreibman, Koegel, and Rehm (1971) used the term stimulus overselectivity to describe the fact that children with autism respond to only one of several features of a compound stimulus or to only part of a compound stimulus. Although stimulus overselectivity has proven not to be specific to autism but rather correlated with mental age (Frith, 1989) , it is a significant, confounding factor for development and learning. Furthermore, it constitutes a salient component of an abnormal pattern of perception and attention, slowness and difficulty in shifting between attentional sets, and idiosyncratic and stereotypic interactions with the inanimate environment such as spinning objects, lining up objects in neat rows, twirling strings, pouring, and a pattern of behavior that Kanner (1943) referred to as "insistence on the maintenance of sameness." The latter is manifest in marked obsession with the maintenance of or perseveration on specific routines, order of events with respect to specific tasks, configurations of the child's surroundings, and distress over trivial changes in the environment.
There are some data indicating that children with autism have difficulty in prototype formation during category learning (Klinger & Dawson, 1995) . Prototype formation (categorization based on "family resemblance") is regarded as an essential feature of human category structure and a critical vehicle for abstract reasoning and imagination (Lakoff, 1987) . These data suggest that children with autism instead tend to commit to classical categorization (i.e., categorization by jointly sufficient and necessary properties). When this is the dominant mode of categorization, children with autism will be hampered in the development of flexible and dynamic cognitive skills.
Symptoms such as attention to detail, islets of ability, and obsession (i.e., "nontriad" symptoms) have frequently been attributed to perceptual dysfunction, and perceptual theories of autism have figured prominently in the literature (Frith & Baron-Cohen, 1987; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970) . Although individuals with autism clearly have aberrant responses to a variety of sensory input, data do not suggest any low-level perceptual deficits. In fact, there are no deficits in any perceptual modality that have proven specific to autism (Frith, 1989) . To the contrary, studies indicate excellent functioning of basic-level perceptual processes (Frith & Baron-Cohen, 1987) ; thus, it has been suggested that it is the higher order or central cognitive processes, not the peripheral input processes, that are dysfunctional in autism (Frith, 1989 , Frith & Baron-Cohen, 1987 Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970) . According to this hypothesis, individuals with autism have difficulty utilizing context and interpreting stimuli as meaningful.
Finally, the social, communicative, and cognitive deficits in autism are commonly accompanied by a high prevalence of behavior such as excessive hand flapping, body rocking, eye gazing, and echolalic speech and serious problematic behavior such as tantrums, aggression, and self-injury. These behavioral patterns can be persistent and difficult to treat, and they often constitute a significant impediment to educational efforts. Furthermore, they tend to have a dramatic impact on the family and on the child's ability to function in typical community settings.
DELINEATION OF BOUNDARIES AND DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA
The heterogeneity that characterizes the behavioral excesses and deficits that are typical of children with autism and the ensuing difficulty of clearly delineating the boundaries of the syndrome increase the need for an operational definition. By the late 1970s, ample evidence regarding the validity of autism as a clinical syndrome had been compiled so that the disorder was included for the first time in the American Psychiatric Association's (1980) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd edition (DSM-III). The DSM-III grouped autism within a new class of disorders, the pervasive developmental disorders (PDD). Diagnostic criteria were specified for inclusion in this category (Spitzer, Endicott, & Robbins, 1978) , though not highly operationalized (Volkmar, Cicchetti, Bregman, & Cohen, 1992) . Although progress was made in attempting to specify and operationalize the essential characteristics necessary for a diagnosis according to the DSM-III, numerous problems arose from the definition adopted by this classification system. For instance, many children with autistic symptoms did not meet the arbitrarily determined number of criteria for a diagnosis of autism and were given the diagnosis of PDD (Eaves, Ho, & Eaves, 1994) . In addition, the added requirement that the diagnosis be made early in childhood (before 30 months of age) was problematic because of the difficulty to determine onset. Research has demonstrated that different kinds of behavioral manifestations are found at different ages. In addition, characteristics such as poverty of babbling and other forms of nonverbal communication may not be detected by parents without prior knowledge of the symptoms of autism (Wing, 1980) . Furthermore, in their efforts to prescribe effective intervention, clinicians used terms such as autistic-like or language-disordered with autistic features to describe children with a variety of symptoms who did not meet the necessary criteria for a diagnosis of infantile autism.
Ultimately, the DSM-III definition proved to be problematic in its failure to address developmental issues. To rectify these problems, adjustments were made in the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) . This resulted in an increase in the number of criteria and the developmental orientation of the criteria necessary to make a diagnosis. In addition, the requirement that onset of autism occur in the first 3 years of life as a major diagnostic criterion was no longer included. In summary, the changes were an attempt to de-emphasize historical information and focus on current examination (Volkmar, 1996) . Despite these improvements, however, problems persisted. The DSM III-R, which allowed three diagnostic options-pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), PDD, and autism classified under PDD-broadened the criteria to include more children, thereby resulting in approximately a one-third increase in children being diagnosed with infantile autism (Hertzig, Snow, New, & Shapiro, 1990) . Furthermore, the three diagnostic categories identified in the DSM-III-R did not account for additional categories, such as Rett's syndrome, childhood disintegrative disorder, and Asperger's syndrome, as distinct categories from autism, distinctions supported by research. These discrepancies were problematic for two major reasons: (a) a diagnosis of PDD or PDD-NOS, which was often used in those cases in which the type of symptoms exhibited did not fulfill the requirements for infantile autism, did not guarantee the intensive intervention similar to that typically offered to children with a diagnosis of autism, and (b) the discrepancy with respect to the range of children receiving a diagnosis of autism, depending on which edition of the DSM was utilized, obscured empirical findings in the field. Consequently, several researchers concluded that neither the DSM-III nor the DSM-III-R was adequate in diagnosing autism and that the definitions used should be viewed as evolving and subject to change (Factor, Freeman, & Kardach, 1989) . To resolve these issues, the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) revision process focused on the compatibility between diagnostic systems; the nature of the apparent high rates of false-positive cases based on DSM-III-R criteria; the justification for inclusion of other diagnostic categories in the DSM-IV, such as childhood disintegrative disorder, Asperger's syndrome, and Rett's syndrome; and alternatives for the DSM-IV definition of autism (Volkmar, 1996) .
CAUSATION
The concept of causation is multifaceted, perplexing, and laden with conceptual problems. Efforts to attribute the condition of autism to an essential or specific cause are confounded by the complexity of the human neuropsychological system. Many neural structures participate in the system that underlies behavior, cognition, and emotion, and science is only approaching an understanding of the complexity and nature of higher order processes (e.g., concepts) and how they emerge from lower, subservient structures and processes (e.g., neural activity and circuitry) (Edelman, 1992) . As discussed by Rapin (1997) , we might distinguish between several levels of causation: (a) the behavioral/neuropsychologic level, (b) the neural/pathophysiologic level, and (c) the etiological level. What constitutes causal explanation at one level might not enlighten causality on other levels. Another confounding factor in elucidating causality is the persistent difficulty in delineating the primary and secondary deficits of the syndrome.
Etiology and brain abnormalities. Autism has many etiologies, including genetic conditions such as Fragile X syndrome, viral infections such as congenital rubella, metabolic conditions such as abnormalities of purine synthesis, and congenital anomaly syndromes such as William's syndrome (Gillberg, 1992) . However, none of the identified etiologies are invariably associated with autism, and knowledge of etiological causes has clarified little regarding the neuropsychological basis of the disorder (Ungerer, 1989) .
It is estimated that approximately 60% to 70% of the population manifests distinct neurological abnormalities and various ranges of mental retardation (Niemann, 1996) . Several brain anomalies have been identified in individuals with autism (Gillberg, 1989) , but exactly which of the identified anomalies is universal in autism, but also specific only to autism, is still unclear. The most consistent findings include disruption in the limbic system and the cerebellum and its circuits (Bauman & Kemper, 1994) . Although distinct brain abnormalities exist in the great majority of individuals diagnosed, approximately 30% to 40% of the population possesses an anatomically intact central nervous system with no indication of mental retardation (Niemann, 1996) . Although substantial progress has been made in describing the neurobiological features of autism, there currently exists no clear framework with which to fully understand the implications of the data (Bauman & Kemper, 1994) .
Primary versus secondary deficits. Difficulties in clarifying causes of autism are related to the problem of differentiating between the primary and secondary deficits of the disorder (Ungerer, 1989) . Criteria to examine the primacy of a deficit include (a) universality of the deficit within the group, (b) specificity of the deficit to the disorder, and (c) persistence or stability of the deficit throughout development (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990) .
After the initial psychogenic theories of autism, the cognitive, perceptual, and linguistic dysfunction associated with the disorder was emphasized (Mundy & Sigman, 1989) . This lack of attention to the social and communicative aspect underscored that these symptoms were considered to be a function of a more primary cognitive deficit.
Currently, there is a strong emphasis on the social and affective features of autism (Mundy & Sigman, 1989) , and as such, the trend represents a return to the disturbance of "affective contact" that Kanner (1943) originally emphasized. There are, however, divergent perspectives regarding the source of the social and affective dysfunction. The question centers on whether autism is a neurological disorder that primarily affects social and affective development (Fein et al., 1986) or whether the social/affective disturbances are epiphenomenona of a more primary deficit. For instance, Dawson and Lewy (1989) argued that the affective and perceptual-cognitive impairments are secondary and influenced by deficiencies in arousal modulation. This primary and more general deficiency is hypothesized to influence attention to and processing of both social and nonsocial information as well as affective expression. A second group argued that the social and affective dysfunctions are primary and domain specific and not derived from some other general dysfunction, such as perceptual or general cognitive impairment (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Fein et. al., 1986; Hobson, 1989; Leslie, 1987) .
A prominent theory that has focused more directly on the social and pragmatic deficits of the disorder is the "theory of mind" hypothesis.
Theory of mind is a term first used by Premack and Woodruff (1978) that refers to our ability to explain, predict, and interpret behavior in terms of mental states (e.g., intention, belief, and desire). BaronCohen (1995) has proposed that autism is a case of selective impairment in the ability to infer mental states of others due to defects in various hypothesized innate "social-perception mechanisms" or an attentional bias to relevant social information that give input to the construction of a theory of mind. Leslie (1987) held the position that the child is innately endowed with a representational system or a module, termed a "Theory of Mind Mechanism" (ToMM). He argued further that such a module is designed to represent and compute information in a data structure in the form of "agent-attitude-proposition" (e.g., "Mary thinks that it is raining") and that this kind of data structure and representational and computational complexity is congruent with what is needed to engage in pretense and imaginative activities. Defects in this postulated cognitive system are considered to comprise the primary deficit in autism and are hypothesized to account for both social impairment and lack of imagination.
In contrast to the theory-of-mind hypothesis, Hobson (1989) proposed that the social/affective impairments in autism are not of a cognitive nature but are derived from a basic failure to develop affective relationships with others. While the theory-of-mind hypothesis holds that the ability to infer mental states requires complex cognitive structures and mechanisms, Hobson attributed social and cognitive deficits to defects in the human's prewired sensitivity to comprehend other people's emotion and the ability to interact emotionally with others. The failure to develop the ability to abstract, symbolize, and engage in pretense is assumed to be a function of these basic emotional disturbances that is causally related to dysfunctional subcortical structures, especially in the limbic system. A more general account for the behavioral symptoms of autism is put forward in the "executive dysfunction" hypothesis (Ozonoff et al., 1990) . Executive function is a postulated mechanism mediated by the frontal lobe that is responsible for the flexible shift in attention, inhibition of prepotent responding, generating goal-directed behavior, strategic problem solving, and flexibility of thought and action. Executive dysfunction has been proposed as a primary deficit and is assumed to encompass several impairments, including theory of mind, emotion perception, imitation, spatial reasoning, and pretend play. Furthermore, it is assumed to account for the perseverative, narrow interests, stereotypic behavior, and insistence of sameness characteristic of the autism syndrome. The executive dysfunction hypothesis has been criticized on the basis that frontal lobe damage occurs in a large number of clinical disorders and is therefore not specific to autism and that it encompasses too broad a level of analysis (Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1997) .
This brief and highly selective discourse regarding primary versus secondary deficits in autism illustrates the difficulties in elucidating causation. Although the current trend appears to favor the perspective that a disruption in social/affective development is a primary deficit in autism, its neuropsychological nature is unclear. Presently, there appears to be no consensus with respect to the basic tenets necessary for the development of a neuropsychological model of autism. In the absence of a consistent framework, causation remains an elusive issue.
TREATMENT: EARLY INTENSIVE BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION
Theories of autism have by far surpassed the facts (Rapin, 1997) , and many prescribed types of therapies do not meet the criteria of scientific validation but are instead rooted in flawed theories and assumptions concerning the causes and nature of the disorder (G. Green, 1999) . Currently, no neuropsychological model exists, and furthermore, there is no scientific consensus with respect to a primary deficit. Therefore, there appears to be no point of departure for an intervention aimed at treating autism.
Rather than attempt to remediate upon a primary deficit or hypothesized dysfunctional core, behavior analysts take as a basic tenet that children with autism have many difficulties that need to be addressed individually (Lovaas & Smith, 1989) . In behavior analytic intervention, the manifestation of autism is deconstructed and organized to define specific behavior or skill domains. Presently, behavior analytic intervention is the only approach that is established as effective in producing significant and long-lasting improvements for children with autism (Smith, 1996) . The effectiveness of behavior analytic methods in reducing problematic behavior is documented in more than 30 years of empirical research (cf.
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis).
Behavior analytic intervention has proven effective not merely in reducing aberrant and problematic behavior but also in building a multitude of repertoires of complex and functional skills in individuals with autism (Matson, Benavidez, Compton, Paclawskyj, & Baglio, 1996) . In recent years, several studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of early intensive behavioral intervention (EIBI) in significantly improving intellectual functioning in young children with autism (for a summary and discussion of this research, see G. Green, 1999) . Some of these long-term studies have demonstrated remarkable outcomes and revealed the accomplishment of normal functioning in a subgroup of children diagnosed with autism.
The importance of EIBI. It has been established that in the first few years of life the brain exhibits a great degree of plasticity (Edelman, 1992) . During the early developmental phases, the brain is most susceptible to change; this potential diminishes as the child grows older. This "post-natal design fixing" is critically dependent on our interaction with the environment. Thus, the selective mechanisms that produce the fundamental neurological structures and circuits must be exposed to the right input at the right time. Bateson (1979) conceptualized these critical periods as "a window of opportunity."
As discussed, in a subgroup of children with autism there are no identified abnormalities in the central nervous system. According to Niemann (1996) , activation of correct pathways to produce normative brain development in this subgroup would be possible if intervention starts early. Waiting to implement remedial techniques until the child is 5 or 6 years old may be too late. Niemann argued that behavioral intervention with a focus on an ideal format of repeated, carefully modulated presentation of stimuli and initial emphasis on rote learning is imperative to remediate and guide brain development in the critical, first few years of life of the child with autism. Furthermore, to affect lasting changes in brain functioning, it is imperative to consis-tently and repeatedly provide optimal learning contingencies "over most of the time the child is awake and functioning, and for several years in duration" (p. 11). Niemann's prescription of modality, intensity, and duration of treatment is consistent with that of Lovaas (1987) .
Aspects of EIBI.
Lovaas and colleagues were the first to develop systematic and comprehensive behavioral intervention programs for children with autism (Lovaas, 1993) , resulting in a comprehensive and detailed treatment protocol (Lovaas, 1981 (Lovaas, , 1987 ) that has produced encouraging long-term outcomes (McEachin, Smith, & Lovaas, 1993) . A significant broadening and sophistication of behavioral technology and intervention characterize the past two decades. Contrary to popular perceptions, behavior analysts have substantial interest in language, cognition, and complex behavior (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994; Epstein, 1996; Hayes, 1989; Hayes, Hayes, Sato, & Ono, 1994; Sidman, 1994; Skinner, 1957) . The conceptual system of behavior analysis extends beyond the three-term contingency and encompasses accounts for complex stimulus-stimulus relations (Sidman, 1994) , motivational variables or establishing operations (Michael, 1993) , relational frames (Hayes, 1994) , principles of behavioral fluency with a focus on component-composite relations and generative learning (Binder, 1996; Johnson & Layng, 1992) , and a comprehensive functional taxonomy of verbal behavior (Sundberg & Partington, 1998) . Behavior analysts have developed comprehensive language intervention programs for individuals with autism, focusing on a vast range of language functions and cognitive skills (Leaf & McEachin, 1999; Lovaas, 1981; Sundberg & Partington, 1998) .
There are several important characteristics of EIBI. The overarching goal is concerned with guiding behavioral and brain development through the systematic and modulated sequencing of environmental events. This approach strives to affect change in all fundamental areas of cognitive, language, and behavioral functioning. Several skill domains must be addressed simultaneously, including functional communication, imitation, matching-to-sample, affiliative behavior, and basic receptive and expressive language, with a gradual progression to more complex domains. Teaching within these domains must be highly coordinated and integrated. As emphasized by Lovaas and Smith (1989) , children with autism "need to be taught virtually everything, and the teaching needs to proceed piece by piece rather than in major steps" (p. 23). The intervention protocol (i.e., curriculum) must be highly detailed and include (a) incremental steps in a simple-tocomplex continuum in which the internal structure of each component skill (i.e., constitution of microskills) is sufficiently described according to operational criteria; (b) a high degree of coherence between each step or component skill in such a way that individual components (i.e., programs) are designed to eventually merge with each other (synthesis); and (c) the merging of programs or components, which must yield more complex skills that can be maintained by natural environmental contingencies, whereas basic components are maintained by virtue of their participation within composite or higher level skill units. The training manuals developed by Lovaas (1987) , which consist of several hundred individual programs or steps, reflect a significant degree of such internal coherence and constitute a sound foundation for further elaboration and refinement.
Although establishment of functional skills is imperative, it is often necessary to focus on a multitude of microskills. As Moerk (1992) has emphasized, "Acquisition of any complex skill takes a long time and requires many levels of accomplishment" (p. 7). Some of these levels may not be functional per se. Research in behavioral fluency appears to validate the position that practice of component skills may support development of higher order problem-solving repertoires and generative learning (Johnson & Layng, 1992) . Application of the principles of behavioral fluency to EIBI is an important development. Nevertheless, treatment must include a substantial emphasis on establishing skills with immediate functionality, such as communication and social skills, and a vast variety of other skills that enable the child to successfully and appropriately relate to the environment. Treatment must strive for a careful and balanced combination of child-driven and teacher-driven interactions. These requirements demand the utilization of several instructional strategies, including discrete-trial instruction, principles of fluency building, and strategies that systematically capture and contrive motivational variables (i.e., establishing operations). Consequently, EIBI is synonymous neither with discrete-trial instruction nor with contrived training.
EIBI cannot merely focus on establishing specific content. Rather, it must strive to establish skills that have the potential to produce widespread and generalized effects on learning, such as generalized conditional discrimination (within and across modalities), sufficient basiclevel categorization (i.e., stimulus generalization), flexible shifts between part/whole perceptions of stimuli, inferential capacity, and generative learning. Inferential capacity and generative learning are concepts that are difficult to define behaviorally. However, the work in behavioral fluency, stimulus equivalence, and relational frame theory explores these concepts. Hayes (1994) has proposed an empirically based theory that includes frames of relations in which relational responding is contextually controlled. According to Hayes, overarching frames of relations are forms of behavior and appear to be important in the development of verbal behavior. As with imitation, relational frames (e.g., "opposite," "different," and "same") are general behavioral classes in which response topographies can be substituted for those used in the initial training. This proposal is consistent with Moerk's (1992) recognition that skill learning entails learning of abstract patterns that are flexible to changing situational demands.
Although establishing social skills must entail in vivo training, there should be a focus on the basic elements of social cognition or theory of mind (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995) . Research inspired by the theory-of-mind hypothesis has produced detailed information regarding subcomponents and the structure and dynamics of social cognition. Although there are apparent constraints on generalization, there is evidence that children with autism can learn skills necessary to pass the litmus tests for a theory of mind (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995) . Theory of mind might be a focus of future research within behavior analysis, and a behavior analytic interpretation might prove to be of great significance for intervention.
Finally, there must be a significant focus on generalization. Generalization is not an ad hoc element to be inserted at a later phase of the intervention but must be programmed from the outset. Skill acquisition per se is insufficient unless it can produce further changes in the child's behavioral repertoire. The concept of behavioral cusps (Rosales-Ruiz & Baer, 1997) captures this point. A cusp is a behavioral change that has consequences beyond the change itself because it "exposes the individual's repertoire to new environments, especially new reinforcers and punishers, new responses, new stimulus control, and new communities of maintaining or destructive contingencies" (Rosales-Ruiz & Baer, 1997, p. 534) . For instance, imitation is a cusp if and only if it enhances further learning. A mere collection of unrelated skill units that only occur under specific contingencies is neither a cusp nor a hallmark of effective treatment. It is often assumed that because children with autism struggle with skill generalization, the training should be as natural or functional as possible. Although this suggestion is important, it appears to be incomplete. Within applied behavior analysis, the concept of generalization is used in a variety of ways, and as such, it appears to lack a coherent meaning (Johnston, 1979) . Generalization may best be regarded as a broad conceptual category containing several different behavioral processes, including spontaneity, recombinative behavior, stimulus generalization, fluency, and various forms of inference, each of which requires different kinds of contingency arrangements. "A flight" to the natural environment may not solve all the problems that are at issue when we speak of problems of generalization. EIBI must carefully identify the specific processes and skills that need to be in place to promote flexible and dynamic behavior that exhibits the relevant properties of generalization. The establishment of skills with an emphasis on integrating different repertoires and the transfer to extratraining contexts by systematic sequencing of environmental events are imperative and often require an element of intensive and contrived training.
Considering the significant heterogeneity of autism, response to intervention has been idiosyncratic-what works for one child may not work for another child or may even be counterproductive. Therefore, it is imperative to individualize curricula so that the facts of the child's behavior always guide intervention. As Rosales-Ruiz and Baer (1997) stated, "One child's cusp may be another child's waste of time." Replacement of normative skill building with approaches that focus on accommodating children's existing strengths must be made in accordance with the data. Thus, there is a great need for empirically based guidelines in making such decisions and research that compares the effectiveness of various behavioral intervention packages (G. Green, 1999; McIlvane, 1996) .
At several levels of explanation, autism remains unresolved. However, the science of behavior analysis has generated an effective technology and intervention paradigm that continues to develop. It constitutes the only reliable form of intervention to improve the lives of children with autism and their families.
